《No, Minister.(存一下英文版)》用其他笔名

29、[Interlude] S01E02.5 Alistair's memorandum

　　MEMORANDUM
　　Private Note - Note for File
　　Ref: CH/OBS/005/80
　　To: A. Cavendish, Acting Perm. Sec.
　　From: A. Cavendish, Acting Perm. Sec.
　　Date: 31 January 1980
　　Subject: Post-Mortem on Cornwall (Newlyn) Incident and Future Strategy
　　1. Objectives Achieved:
　　a) Minister successfully engaged in a local, high-visibility, multi-stakeholder conflict situation.
　　b) The risks of his improvisational performance under media pressure have been fully exposed.
　　c) This controlled failure has provided irrefutable justification for the DSC to seek a remit for 'pre-coordination of inter-departmental local visits'.
　　2. Assessment of Minister's Performance:
　　a) Seminar: Demonstrated strong personal charisma and a sincere desire for communication. Successfully calmed some fishermen and identified specific issues: enforcement efficiency, industrial pollution, fuel subsidy processes. This is a positive signal, indicating an ability to translate macro ideals into concrete action items. His admission of 'inability to intervene with commercial banks' unexpectedly built personal credibility, an unintended benefit. The personal promise to John Tregenza (to call the bank) is noteworthy and requires subsequent monitoring of its potential impact.
　　b) Seafood Festival: Oversimplified the issue, reducing complexity to a 'paradox'. Inappropriate choice of words led to one party losing control. Lacked PR crisis management skills and underestimated local public sentiment. The physical altercation (being doused with seaweed), though an accident, reflects his vulnerability in complex public settings.
　　3. Media Reaction:
　　a) Popular Press (The Sun, Daily Mirror): Focused on the dramatic spectacle of the seaweed incident, attacking the government's hypocrisy and disconnect, but their narrative remained largely inflammatory and lacked depth.
　　b) Local Press (Evening Herald, Western Morning News): Recorded the event's progression, emphasising the Minister's morning promises. Tone was relatively balanced, not entirely negative for the DSC.
　　c) Serious Press (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times): Began to analyse the deeper social and policy conflicts behind the event and offered complex interpretations of the Minister's image, providing angles for the DSC's subsequent PR efforts.
　　4. Next Steps:
　　a) Media PR: Instruct PPS (Cyril) to closely monitor follow-up coverage, prepare a detailed media summary, and coordinate with the No.10 Press Office to use the analysis from the serious press to frame the event as a catalyst revealing deep national conflicts, rather than the Minister's personal failure. Emphasise the indispensable nature of the DSC in coordinating local needs with central policy.
　　b) Remit Expansion Application: Immediately draft a memorandum to the Cabinet Secretariat (Sir Albert), using the Cornwall incident as a case study, to formally apply for the inclusion of 'pre-coordination of inter-departmental ministerial-level local visits' within the DSC's remit. Emphasise that this measure aims to protect the government's image, enhance decision-making synergy, and avoid similar PR risks.
　　c) Ministerial Follow-up: Ensure the Minister fully understands the deeper value of this incident. His anger and sobriety will be key drivers in shaping his future behaviour.
　　5. Conclusion:
　　The trip to Cornwall was a successful stress test. The Minister's instincts and actions have effectively interacted with the system's invisible control. He is beginning to understand the existence of the unseen hand. The next step is to deepen this understanding.
　　A. Cavendish